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Stochastic dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma with cooperation facilitators
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In the framework of the paradigmatic prisoner’s dilemma game, we investigate the evolutionary
dynamics of social dilemmas in the presence of “cooperation facilitators”. In our model, cooperators
and defectors interact as in the classic prisoner’s dilemma, where selection favors defection. However,
here the presence of a small number of cooperation facilitators enhances the fitness (reproductive
potential) of cooperators, while it does not alter that of defectors. In a finite population of size
N , the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma with facilitators is characterized by the probability that
cooperation takes over (fixation probability) and by the mean times to reach the absorbing states.
These quantities are computed exactly and using Fokker-Planck equations. Our findings, corrob-
orated by stochastic simulations, demonstrate that the influence of facilitators crucially depends
on the difference between their density z and the game’s cost-to-benefit ratio r. When z > r, the
fixation of cooperators is likely in a large population and, under weak selection pressure, invasion
and replacement of defection by cooperation is favored by selection if b(z− r)(1− z) > N−1, where
0 < b ≤ 1 is the cooperation payoff benefit. When z < r, the fixation probability of cooperators is
exponentially enhanced by the presence of facilitators but defection is the dominating strategy.
PACS numbers: 05.40.-a, 02.50.-r, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding the origin of cooperative behavior is a
central issue in the life and behavioral sciences, and has
recently been listed among the major scientific puzzles to
be elucidated [1]. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) pro-
vides the ideal framework to study the competition be-
tween species and there is a long tradition of modeling the
evolution of cooperation using evolutionary games [2, 3].
In recent years, these processes have increasingly been
investigated using the methods of statistical physics, see
e.g. [2] and references therein. In EGT, successful species
spread at the expense of the others, and each individ-
ual’s reproductive potential (fitness) varies with the pop-
ulation’s composition that continuously changes in time.
The interaction between the species is thus accounted for
by a fitness-dependent (or “frequency-dependent”) selec-
tion pressure [2], as observed in various experiments [4].
Quite intriguingly, in such a setting the optimization of
the fitness at an individual level can result in the re-
duction of the population overall fitness [2, 3]. An in-
fluential example of such a paradoxical behavior, is pro-
vided by the celebrated prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game
that serves as a metaphor for social dilemmas. In fact, in
the classic PD individual interest leads to defection, even
though mutual cooperation would be socially more ben-
eficial [2, 3]. While the PD is the paradigmatic model
for the evolution of cooperation, its main prediction is
at odds with the cooperative behavior that is commonly
observed in experimental realizations [4, 5]. This has
motivated an upsurge of research aiming to identify the
possible mechanisms capable of promoting cooperation
in biological and social systems [6]. Notably, it has been
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proposed that cooperation can be promoted by kin and
group selection [7], as well as by conditional behavioral
rules leading to direct or indirect reciprocity [8, 9]. It
has also been found that local interactions may pro-
mote cooperation in some social dilemmas [10]. Further-
more, it has been shown that cooperation is supported in
games with voluntary participation, or with punishment
for non-cooperation [11].
In this work, we investigate an alternative scenario for
the spread of cooperation in social dilemmas: we con-
sider the evolution of the prisoner’s dilemma in a finite
population comprising a small number of “cooperation
facilitators”. The facilitators participate in the dynam-
ics only by enhancing the reproductive potential of coop-
erators, while they do not affect the fitness of defectors
(see Sec. II below). To study the influence of cooperation
facilitators on the prisoner’s dilemma dynamics, the evo-
lution is modeled in terms of a birth-death process and
the fixation properties are studied analytically. In fact,
it is well established that the evolutionary dynamics in
finite populations is efficiently characterized by the prob-
abilities of reaching the absorbing states, where the ex-
tinction of one or more species and the fixation of another
occur [2, 12–15]. Here, we are particularly interested in
the probability that, from a given initial composition, the
population eventually comprises only cooperators and a
small fraction of facilitators, but no defectors (“cooper-
ation fixation probability”). The mean times for these
events (mean fixation times) are also studied and our
results are checked against stochastic simulations. This
approach allows us to (i) discuss how demographic fluc-
tuations alter the mean field predictions of the classic
replicator equations [2], and (ii) thoroughly analyze the
circumstances under which facilitators and selection favor
a single cooperator invading and replacing a population
of defectors.
This paper is organized as follows: The PD with co-
2operation facilitators is introduced in the next section,
where some of its properties are discussed. In Section
III the dynamics with the Fermi process is characterized
by the fixation probability (Sec. III.A) and the mean fix-
ation times (Sec. III.B). The dynamics with the Moran
process is studied in Section IV, while we summarize our
findings and present our conclusions in Section V.
II. PRISONER’S DILEMMA WITH
COOPERATION FACILITATORS: MODEL AND
DYNAMICS
In evolutionary game theory, two-player games can be
interpreted as dilemmas of cooperation. In fact, the two
possible strategies can be interpreted as “cooperation”
(C) and “defection” (D). The paradigm of social dilemma
is provided by the classic prisoner’s dilemma (PD), whose
main features are captured by the following payoff matrix
giving the pairwise interaction between cooperators and
defectors [2, 3, 10][16]:
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
, (1)
where b and c respectively represent the benefit and the
cost of cooperation, with b > c > 0. Here, without loss of
generality, we assume that 0 < b ≤ 1. According to (1),
mutual cooperation leads to a payoff b − c > 0 and mu-
tual defection gives a payoff 0; whereas when one player
defects and the other cooperates, the defector receives
a payoff b and the cooperators gets −c. In the (classic)
PD, the dilemma arises from the fact that each individual
is better off not cooperating, even though mutual coop-
eration enhances the population overall payoff. Hence,
while cooperation is socially beneficial, defection is the
only (strict) Nash equilibrium in the PD [2, 3].
In this work, we consider a finite population compris-
ing N individuals on a complete graph (no spatial struc-
ture). The number of cooperators and defectors is re-
spectively denoted by j and k. In addition to coopera-
tors and defectors, we consider that the population also
comprises a fixed (small) number ℓ of “cooperation fa-
cilitators” (ℓ ≪ N). These facilitators cooperate with
C−players and therefore enhance the reproductive poten-
tial (fitness) of cooperators, while they leave the fitness of
defectors unaltered, see below. Hence, while the number
of cooperators and defectors in the population changes in
time (j and k vary), the total number of cooperators and
defectors j + k = N − ℓ is conserved. According to the
tenets of EGT, the variation in time of the number of co-
operators and defectors depends on their average payoffs,
πC and πD respectively, obtained from the payoff matrix
(1). Here, since facilitators enhance πC by cooperating
with C individuals and have no (direct) influence on πD,
one has
πC = (b − c)
j + ℓ− 1
N − 1
− c
k
N − 1
πD = b
j
N − 1
, (2)
where we have excluded self-interactions from the defi-
nition of the payoffs [2]. The population average pay-
off is given by π¯ = (jπC + kπD)/N . It is worth notic-
ing that the expression of πC now comprises a term
(b − c)ℓ/(N − 1) > 0 reflecting the positive contribu-
tion of facilitators to the cooperators payoff. In evolu-
tionary dynamics, it is customary to add a baseline con-
stant, here set to 1, to the payoffs πC/D of the spreading
species [2, 13], yielding the fitness of species C and D,
respectively given by
fC = 1 + πC = 1 + b
[
j + ℓ− r(N − 1)− 1
N − 1
]
fD = 1 + πD = 1 + b
j
N − 1
, (3)
where, we have introduced the cost-to-benefit ratio r ≡
c/b (with 0 < r < 1) and have used k = N − j − ℓ. Sim-
ilarly, the average fitness of the entire population reads
f¯ = (jfC + kfD)/N = 1 + [b(1 − r)j − ℓ]/N and grows
linearly with the density x ≡ j/N of cooperators.
The size of the population being finite, the evolution-
ary dynamics is modeled as a continuous-time birth-
death process [2, 17, 18]. In this model, only pairs
of cooperators and defectors interact (according to (1))
and the stochastic dynamics is implemented as follows:
(i) at each time step a pair of individuals is randomly
chosen from the entire population; (ii) unless a pair of
cooperator-defector is drawn, nothing happens; and (iii)
if one picks a cooperator-defector pair, one of these in-
dividuals is randomly chosen for reproduction (propor-
tionally to its fitness) and the other is replaced by the
newborn offspring. Hence, at each interaction the num-
ber of cooperators increases or decreases by one. The
time evolution of this birth-death process can therefore
be described by the random variable j giving the number
of cooperators and by the rates T±j associated with the
transitions j → j ± 1, respectively. Here, we consider
T±j =
j(N − ℓ− j)
N(N − 1)
Ψ±(fC, fD), (4)
where j(N − ℓ− j)/N(N − 1) accounts for the probabil-
ity of picking a cooperator-defector pair, while Ψ± are
functions of the fitnesses (3) that encode the interactions
(selection) according to the chosen “microscopic” update
rule [2]. We here discuss the cases where Ψ± correspond
to (i) the Fermi process (FP) [19, 20] and (ii) the Moran
process (MP) [2, 12, 14, 20, 21] that are commonly used
in EGT [2].
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the influence of
selection are generally characterized by the fixation prop-
erties, namely the probability that a given species fixates
3(takes over) the whole population and by the mean time
for such an event to occur [2, 12, 13]. In the absence of
facilitators, fixation happens when only one species sur-
vives and the population composition is uniform. Here,
as the number of facilitators remains constant, fixation
will be achieved when one of the absorbing states is
reached and either all cooperators are replaced by de-
fectors, or vice versa, resulting in a (non-uniform) popu-
lation comprising ℓ facilitators and N − ℓ cooperators
or defectors. In this work, we are particularly inter-
ested in the probability φCj that, starting with j coop-
erators, all defectors are eventually removed from the
population and replaced by cooperators. As discussed
in Sec. III.A., the fixation probability φCj is necessary to
establish when selection favors cooperation replacing de-
fection [13]. In the framework of the above birth-death
process (4), this probability obeys the backward master
equation [2, 14, 18]
φCj = T
−
j φ
C
j−1 + T
+
j φ
C
j+1 + [1− T
−
j − T
+
j ]φ
C
j , (5)
with absorbing boundaries φC0 = 0 and φ
C
N−ℓ = 1. The
formal solution of Eq. (5) reads [2, 14, 18]
φCj =
1 +
∑j−1
n=1
∏n
m=1
(
T−j /T
+
j
)
1 +
∑N−ℓ−1
n=1
∏n
m=1
(
T−j /T
+
j
) . (6)
Since the above birth-death process is a one-dimensional
Markov chain, other quantities like the mean fixation
times (MFTs) can, in principle, be obtained exactly, but
yield unwieldy expressions [14, 18]. When the popula-
tion size N is large, it is often much more useful to de-
scribe the fixation properties in terms of the diffusion
approximation obtained in the continuum limit (N ≫ 1)
by a second-order size-expansion of the master equation
resulting in a Fokker-Planck equation [12, 15, 17, 18].
By denoting x ≡ j/N and y ≡ k/N the initial den-
sity of cooperators and defectors, respectively; and with
z ≡ ℓ/N being the fraction of facilitators in the pop-
ulation, the (backward) Fokker-Planck equation (FPE)
associated with (5) reads [17, 18]
Gback(x)φ
C(x) = 0, (7)
where φC(x) ≡ φCj/N and
Gback(x) ≡ [T
+(x)− T−(x)]
d
dx
+
1
2N
[T+(x) + T−(x)]
d2
dx2
, (8)
with T±(x) ≡ T±j/N and, as usual, the density x changes
by ±δ = ±N−1 at each cooperator-defector interaction.
In the realm of the Fokker-Planck equation, the timescale
is such that the time-step is δ = N−1. The formulation in
terms of the FPE allows a neat connection with the mean
field treatment of the dynamics. In fact, when N → ∞
and all demographic fluctuations are negligible, the time
variation of the density of cooperators is given by the
drift term of (8) [17], i.e.
dx(t)
dt
= T+(x) − T−(x) (9)
= x(1 − z − x)[Ψ+(fC, fD)−Ψ
−(fC, fD)].
As for the classic PD, this rate equation admits two ab-
sorbing fixed points, x = 0 (no cooperators) and x = 1−z
(no defectors), but possesses no interior fixed point since
Ψ+(fC(x), fD(x)) 6= Ψ
−(fC(x), fD(x)) for the Fermi and
Moran processes, see below. As discussed in what follows,
the stability of these fixed points depends on the differ-
ence between the cost-to-benefit ratio r and the fraction
z of facilitators.
III. DYNAMICS WITH THE FERMI PROCESS
The stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games is of-
ten conveniently modeled in terms of the so-called Fermi
process (FP), see, for example, [19]. In the FP, at each
time-step two individuals are randomly drawn from the
entire population and one of them reproduces at the ex-
pense of the other that is replaced by the newborn off-
spring. This happens with a probability proportional
to the difference between the fitness of the interacting
individuals and given by the Fermi function from sta-
tistical physics. Since only the CD pairs interact, the
dynamics with the FP is described by the birth-death
process defined by (4) and Ψ± = [1 + e∓(fC−fD)]−1 =
[1+e∓(πC−πD)]−1 [19]. With these expressions of Ψ±, one
checks that Ψ+(fC, fD) 6= Ψ
−(fC, fD) (since fC 6= fD, see
Eqs. (3),(24)), which confirms the absence of an interior
fixed point in the mean field (continuum) limit.
A. Fixation probability
With (3), the transition rates (4) for the Fermi process
read
T±j =
j(N − ℓ− j)
N(N − 1)
1
1 + exp(±vN )
, (10)
with
vN ≡ fD − fC = b
[
r −
(
z −
1
N
)(
1 +
1
N − 1
)]
(11)
This quantity measures the selection pressure [22].
Clearly, −bz < vN < b(1 − z) and |vN | ≤ 1. In the
continuum limit N ≫ 1, the densities x = j/N, z = ℓ/N ,
and vN → v ≡ b(r− z) are treated as continuous quanti-
ties, and the absence of self-interaction is ignored yielding
the transition rates (10)
T±(x) =
x(1 − z − x)
1 + e±v
. (12)
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FIG. 1: (Color online). Probabilities φCj and φ
D
j for various
z = ℓ/N as function of j/(N − ℓ) = x/(1 − z), and evolu-
tion with the Fermi process. Results of stochastic simulations
(symbols) for φCj are compared with the predictions (curves)
of (14) for z = 0 (×, dot-dashed), 0.08 (, solid), 0.12 (∇,
dashed). Similarly for φDj with z = 0 (⋄, thin dashed), 0.08 (◦,
solid gray), 0.12 (△, thin solid). The other parameters are
N = 200, b = 1.0, c = 0.1 (i.e. r = 0.1). Stochastic simula-
tions are for the birth-death process defined by (10) and have
been averaged over 2× 105 samples.
The rate equation corresponding to the mean field dy-
namics with the Fermi process is obtained by using (12)
into (9), and is characterized by a single stable (absorb-
ing) fixed point corresponding to a stationary density
x∗ =
{
xC = 1− z (no defectors) if v < 0
xD = 0 (no cooperators) if v > 0
(13)
of cooperators. This means that cooperation prevails
(x∗ = xC, no defectors) in an infinitely large popula-
tion comprising a fraction z of facilitators higher than
the cost-to-benefit ratio r, i.e. when v < 0. However, as
in the traditional PD, defection wins (x∗ = xD, no coop-
erators) if z is less than r (v > 0). In other words, for
cooperation to prevail (x∗ = xC) at mean field level, it
is necessary that the density of facilitators compensates
the cost of cooperation relative to its benefit.
When the population size is finite, demographic fluctu-
ations are important and the evolution is thus no longer
aptly described by the mean field dynamics (9). In par-
ticular, the mean field results (13) do not account for
the nonzero probability that a single cooperator can in-
vade and replace a (finite) population of defectors. Here,
to investigate how the above mean field picture (9),(13)
is altered by fluctuations arising in a finite population,
we compute the probability φCj that defection is eventu-
ally replaced by cooperation in a population comprising
initially j cooperators and N − ℓ − j defectors. Since
T+j /T
−
j = e
vN , this probability can be obtained explic-
itly using (6) and, when vN 6= 0 [22], one finds
φCj =
ejvN − 1
eN(1−z)vN − 1
, (14)
while fixation probability of defectors is simply given by
φDj ≡ 1 − φ
C
j = (e
N(1−z)vN − ejvN )/(eN(1−z)vN − 1). As
shown in Fig. 1, where results of stochastic simulations
obtained using the Gillespie algorithm [23] are reported,
the predictions of (14) are in excellent agreement with
numerical simulations. The expression (14) implies that
φCj ≃
{
1− e−j|vN | if vN < 0
(ejvN − 1) e−N(1−z)vN if vN > 0,
(15)
when N |vN | ≫ 1. In particular, the cooperation fixation
probability starting with a single cooperator reads
φC1 =
evN − 1
eN(1−z)vN − 1
≃
{
1− e−|vN | if vN < 0
(evN − 1) e−N(1−z)vN if vN > 0.
(16)
The findings (14)-(16), summarized in Fig. 1, illustrate
how a small fraction z of cooperation facilitators affects
the fixation probabilities in a large, yet finite, popula-
tion with an initial density of cooperators comparable to,
or larger than, the density of defectors: When vN < 0
(z > r), the fixation probability of cooperators is much
higher than that of defectors, φCj ≫ φ
D
j , and the spread
of cooperation is thus efficiently promoted by facilitators.
Yet, it is worth noticing that defectors still have finite
probability to fixate even when z > r (and x ≪ 1 − z),
contrary to the mean field prediction (13). The opposite
situation arises when vN > 0 (z < r), as shown in Fig. 1.
The results (15) and (16) can also be used to assess the
influence of selection on the evolutionary dynamics [2]:
Following the seminal work of Ref. [13], we can estab-
lish when selection favors cooperation (C) invading and
replacing defection (D). Selection is said to favor the re-
placement of D by C if the fixation probability φC1 of a
single cooperator in a population of N − ℓ − 1 defectors
is greater than in absence of selection pressure (vN = 0)
when φC1,vN=0 = (N − ℓ)
−1 [22]. With (16), this yields
the condition 1− e−|vN | > (N(1− z))−1 that is generally
satisfied in large populations under non-vanishing selec-
tion pressure. An interesting result arises when the se-
lection intensity is weak and the population size is large,
i.e. |vN | → |v| ≪ 1 and N ≫ 1. In such a limit,
φC1 ≃ |v| when z > r (see Fig. 2 where |v| = 0.02)
and selection favors cooperation replacing defection pro-
vided that b(z − r) > (N(1 − z))−1. Moreover, selec-
tion favors C invading D when fC > fD [13]. With (3),
this yields the condition z − r > (1 − r)/N . There-
fore, under weak selection (|v| ≪ 1 and N ≫ 1) se-
lection favors the invasion and replacement of D by C if
z − r > 1N max
(
1− r, 1b(1−z)
)
. Since 0 < b ≤ 1, one
has 1 − r ≤ (b(1 − z))−1 and cooperation invading and
replacing defection is favored by selection provided that
b(z − r)(1 − z) > N−1. (17)
5One can also use the results (16) to determine the cir-
cumstances under which defection is evolutionary stable.
In fact according to [13], and as natural extension of
the concept of evolutionary stability for infinitely large
populations and deterministic evolutionary dynamics [2],
D is evolutionary stable in a finite population if (i) se-
lection opposes C invading D, implying fC < fD, i.e.
z − r < (1− r)/N ; and if (ii) selection opposes C replac-
ing D, i.e. φC1 < (N − ℓ)
−1. The condition (ii) is clearly
always satisfied when |vN | is finite, and in this case de-
fection is evolutionary stable if z− r < (1− r)/N . In the
weak selection limit where |v| ≪ 1 (with N ≫ 1), the
condition (ii) yields z− r < (bN(1−z))−1. Hence, defec-
tion is evolutionary stable under weak selection in a large
population if z− r < 1N min
(
1− r, 1b(1−z)
)
= (1− r)/N .
Since r < 1, this clearly means that defection is evolu-
tionary stable and is the dominating strategy when z < r.
It is worth noticing that in the limit of an infinite popu-
lation, N →∞, one recovers the mean field results (13):
cooperation prevails only if z > r, according to (17), and
defection dominates otherwise.
The meaning of the results (15)-(17) is illustrated
in Fig. 2 where φCj has been computed in populations
comprising a small initial number of cooperators (j =
1, ..., 10) and an excellent agreement with (15) and (16)
has been found. In Fig. 2, |vN | ≪ 1 and we notice that φ
C
j
increases linearly in x = j/N ≪ 1, with a slope steeper
than (1− z)−1 when z > r and selection favors coopera-
tion replacing defection. The slope is less than (1− z)−1
when z < r and the fixation of cooperation is opposed
by selection. To further appreciate the implications of
(14)-(17), it is useful to compare these results with those
obtained in the absence of facilitators. Putting z = 0
in (14)-(17), one recovers the results for the classic PD
when cooperation fixation probability vanishes exponen-
tially with the population size N : φCj,z=0 ∼ e
−(N−j)c and
φC1,z=0 ∼ e
−Nc [2, 14] (see Fig. 1).
Our findings therefore demonstrate that facilitators
greatly influence the probability that cooperation pre-
vails and are summarized in Fig. 1. As illustrated in
that figure, the influence of facilitators crucially depends
on the difference between their density z and the cost-to-
benefit ratio r:
i. When vN < 0, the fixation of cooperators is likely
(but not certain) even when they are initially in
minority, i.e. even when initially x = j/N < 1/2.
ii. When vN < 0 and N |vN | ≫ 1, the fixation prob-
ability of a single cooperator is generally higher
than in the absence of selection pressure (vN = 0).
In this case, with z > r, selection favors coopera-
tion invading and replacing defection, see (16) and
Figs. 1 and 2. Furthermore, under weak selection
pressure and in a large population (|v| ≪ 1 and
N ≫ 1), the fixation probability of a single cooper-
ator is independent of N , φC1 ≃ z − r. In this case
invasion and replacement of defection by coopera-
tion is favored by selection if (17) is satisfied.
0.005 0.0200
0.05
0.10
0.15
j/N
φ
C j
FIG. 2: (Color online). Probability φCj as function of j/N
when the initial number of cooperators is j = 1 − 10 with
N = 500, and j = 1− 5 with N = 200. The dynamics is im-
plemented according to the Fermi Process with (10). The re-
sults of stochastic simulations (symbols, averaged over 2×105
samples) are compared with (14) (curves/lines). Parameters
are b = 1.0, c = 0.1 (i.e. r = 0.1), and (N, z) = (500, 0.12) (◦),
(200, 0.08) (⋄). Here, φC1 ≃ 0.0182 (◦) and φ
C
1 ≃ 2.88 ×
10−4 (⋄), see text. The dashed/dotted/thin lines correspond
to φCj ≃ jvN/(e
N(1−z)vN − 1) with (N, z) = (500, 0.12)
(dashed) and φCj,vN=0 = j/(N−ℓ) for (N, ℓ) = (200, 16) (thin)
and (N, ℓ) = (500, 60) (dashed-dotted).
iii. When vN > 0, selection always opposes cooper-
ation replacing defection. In this case, while de-
fection is evolutionary stable and is the dominat-
ing strategy when z < r, the cooperation fixation
probability is exponentially enhanced by a small
fraction of facilitators. Yet, cooperation is likely to
fixate only if defectors are initially outnumbered by
cooperators, i.e. if j ≫ k, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
B. Mean fixation times
Another quantity of great interest to unveil the influ-
ence of facilitators in the evolutionary dynamics of the
PD is the (unconditional) mean fixation time. This quan-
tity gives the average time necessary to reach one of the
absorbing boundaries, i.e. a population composition with
either 0 or N − ℓ cooperators. The unconditional mean
fixation time (MFT), τj , for a system comprising initially
j cooperators obeys the following backward master equa-
tion [2, 14, 18] (where the time-step is δ = N−1)
τj = δ + T
−
j τj−1 + T
+
j τj+1 + [1− T
−
j − T
+
j ]τj , (18)
with boundary conditions τ0 = τN−ℓ = 0. In principle,
this equation can be solved exactly but the final result is
cumbersome and not enlightening. Here, in the contin-
uum limit N ≫ 1, we work with the continuous quanti-
ties x = j/N, z = ℓ/N and v = b(r − z), and adopt the
6approach of the diffusion theory [12, 17]. The diffusion
approximation is known to be particularly suited to ana-
lyze the dynamics under weak selection, which here cor-
responds to the regime where |v| ≪ 1 [2, 13, 15]. Exact
methods (when available) or other approximations [14],
e.g. the WKB approach [20], are particularly useful to
deal with the case of strong selection intensity and/or
with phenomena like metastability. In the realm of the
diffusion theory, the transition rates of the FP are given
by (12) and the fixation probability of cooperation is ob-
tained by solving (8) which yields
φC(x) =
eNvx − 1
eN(1−z)v − 1
,
while for defection the probability is φD(x) = 1− φC(x).
Similarly, the unconditional MFT is obtained by solv-
ing the backward FPE Gback(x)τ(x) = −1 [15, 17], i.e.
x(1− z − x)
[
tanh
(v
2
) d
dx
−
1
2N
d2
dx2
]
τ(x) = 1, (19)
with the absorbing boundary conditions τ(0) = τ(1 −
z) = 0. When the drift and diffusive terms are of the
same order, i.e. when |v| ∼ N−1 ≪ 1, it follows from
Eq. (19) that the MFT scales linearly with N , i.e.
τ(x) = NFv(x). (20)
The scaling function can be obtained explicitly by solving
Eq. (19) using standard methods, see e.g. [17]. For in-
stance, when the initial density of cooperators and defec-
tors is the same, x = y = (1− z)/2, and |v| ∼ N−1 ≪ 1,
one finds
Fv
(
1− z
2
)
=
e−(2+z)q
q(1− z)(1 + e−q(1−z))
[
e(2+z)q
× {γE − ln 2− Ei(−(1 − z)q)}+ e
(1+2z)q
× {Ei((1 − z)q)− γE − ln (2q)} (21)
+ e3zq {Ei((1 − z)q)− Ei(2(1− z)q)}
+ e3q {Ei(−2(1− z)q)− Ei(−(1− z)q)}
+ e(1+z)q (eq − ezq) ln (1− z)
]
,
where q ≡ N | tanh (v/2)| ≃ N |v|/2, Ei(x) ≡
∫ x
−∞
eu
u du
denotes the usual exponential integral and γE = 0.5772...
is Euler-Mascheroni constant. While the expression of Fv
is usually cumbersome, some useful properties can be di-
rectly inferred from (19). In fact, as Eq. (19) is invariant
under the transformation (x, r) → (1 − z − x, 2z − r),
one has Fv(x) = F−v(1 − z − x) when z is kept fixed.
The unconditional MFT in the Fermi process is there-
fore characterized by the symmetry
τ(x)|r = τ(1 − z − x)|r→r′=2z−r, (22)
where, on the right-hand-side r is replaced by r′ = 2z− r
and v transformed into −v, with z kept fixed. Further-
more, when r = c/b is kept fixed but z varies, (19) is
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FIG. 3: (Color online). Mean fixation times as function of
j/(N−ℓ) = x/(1−z) for the evolution with the Fermi process.
Results of stochastic simulations (symbols) for τ are compared
with the solution (curves) of Eq. (19) for z = 0 (⋄), 0.08 (◦,
solid black), 0.12 (×, solid gray). We also report the numerical
results for the conditional MFTs τC for z = 0.12 () and τD
with z = ℓ/N = 0 (∇), 0.08 (△). The other parameters are
N = 500, b = 1.0, c = 0.1, i.e. r = 0.1. Stochastic simulations
are for the FP with rates (10) and have been averaged over
2× 105 samples.
invariant under the transformation z → z′ = 2r − z and
x → 1 − z′ − x, while the boundary conditions become
τ(1− z′) = 0 and τ(z − z′) = τ(−2v/b) = 0. In the weak
selection regime |v|/b = |z−r| ≪ 1, the second boundary
condition can be approximated by τ(z − z′) ≃ τ(0) = 0,
which allows a mapping onto (19) that yields:
τ(x)|z ≃ τ(1 − z
′ − x)|z→z′=2r−z, (23)
with r = c/b fixed. The comparison between the so-
lution of (19) and the results of stochastic simulations
(for the FP with rates (10)) reported in Fig. 3 shows
that the diffusion approximation aptly captures the func-
tional dependence of τ , even though some deviations (of
about 10%) can be noticed. These deviations stem from
the self-interaction terms that are excluded from (10)
but not in the continuum limit (12) [e.g. in Fig. 3 one
has vN ≃ −0.0182 and v = −0.02 when z = 0.12, and
vN ≃ 0.0218 and v = 0.02 for z = 0.08]. More im-
portantly, the scaling (20) and the relationship (23) are
confirmed by the numerical simulations of Fig. 3. In fact,
in Fig. 3 we notice that τ(x) is a humped function with a
maximum well separated from the absorbing boundaries
and located at x/(1 − z) < 1/2 when z > r and, while
τ scales linearly with N , the presence of facilitators in-
creases the unconditional MFT and its maximum value
at the hump.
In addition to the unconditional MFT, it is also rele-
vant to consider the mean time to specifically reach one of
the absorbing boundaries. Hence, the conditional mean
fixation times τC(x) and τD(x) respectively give the av-
erage time to reach the absorbing boundaries x = 1 − z
7and x = 0 [14, 20]. As for the unconditional MFT,
these quantities can be obtained from a backward FPE in
the realm of the diffusion approximation. In fact, τC(x)
obeys Gback(x)[φ
C(x)τC(x)] = −φC(x), with the absorb-
ing boundaries φC(1− z)τC(1− z) = φC(0)τC(0) = 0 [12].
Since φD(x) = 1 − φC(x) and, from (14), φD(x) =
φC(1− (2r− z)−x), the conditional MFTs in the regime
|v|/b ≪ 1 (weak selection) are related by the relation-
ship τC(1 + z − 2r − x)|z ≃ τ
D(x)|z→z′=2r−z where r
is kept fixed, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Furthermore, one
has φD(x) ≃ 1 when x → 0 and v > 0 (z < r), while
φC(x) ≃ 1 when x → 1 and v < 0 (z > r). This im-
plies that τ(x) ≃
{
τD(x) when v > 0 and x→ 0
τC(x) when v < 0 and x→ 1.
As
shown in Fig. 3, τC(x) decreases while τD(x) increases
monotonically with x/(1 − z).
The influence of facilitators on the unconditional and
conditional MFTs is summarized in Fig. 3. We have
found that in the PD with cooperation facilitators all
conditional and unconditional MFTs scale linearly with
the population size N when |v| ∼ N−1 (weak selection).
While a similar scaling is also obtained in the absence of
facilitators, the MFTs at a fixed value x/(1−z) are found
to be significantly increased by the presence of facilita-
tors. Hence, the presence of cooperation facilitators has
the quantitative effect to prolong the coexistence and the
competition between cooperators and defectors before an
absorbing state is reached, see Fig. 3.
IV. DYNAMICS WITH THE
FITNESS-DEPENDENT MORAN PROCESS
The stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games is of-
ten implemented in terms of the Moran process, see
e.g. [2, 13], that was originally introduced in population
genetics [12, 21]. In its essence, the Moran model is a
birth-death process where one randomly picked individ-
ual produces an offspring proportionally to its fitness rel-
ative to the population average fitness. The resulting
offspring then replaces another individual that is ran-
domly picked to be removed from the population whose
size is therefore conserved. Here, as the interactions are
between cooperators and defectors, the Moran process is
implemented with Ψ+ = fC/f¯ and Ψ
− = fD/f¯ in (4).
Since fC 6= fD when v 6= 0 [see (24) and [22]], one veri-
fies that Ψ+(fC, fD) 6= Ψ
−(fC, fD) implying the absence
of an interior fixed point in the mean field (continuum)
limit. The Moran process is usually investigated when
the selection intensity is weak, both for technical con-
venience (the mathematical treatment simplifies greatly)
and for the biological relevance of such a limit [2, 12, 13].
In this section, the stochastic dynamics with the Moran
process is investigated in the weak selection limit, where
|v| = b|r − z| ≪ 1, using the diffusion approximation.
A. Fixation probability
In the continuum limit, the fitnesses (3) become
fC(x) = 1− v + bx and fD(x) = 1 + bx, (24)
with f¯(x) = 1 − z + b(1 − r)x. The transition rates for
the Moran process thus read
T+/−(x) = x(1 − z − x)
fC/D(x)
f¯(x)
. (25)
With (24) and (25), the mean field dynamics is described
by the rate equation (9) whose properties are similar to
those discussed for the Fermi process. In particular, the
rate equation (9) for the Moran process is also character-
ized by a single stable (absorbing) fixed point x∗ = xC
(no defectors) if v < 0 and x∗ = xD (no cooperators) if
v > 0 [see (13)].
To understand how the combined effect of nonlinear
selection and demographic noise alters the mean field de-
scription, we now compute the cooperation fixation prob-
ability in the realm of the diffusion approximation. In
such a setting, the fixation probability φC(x) is given by
the FPE (7,8) with the boundary conditions φC(0) = 0
and φC(1 − z) = 1. The solution of (7) is given by [17]
φC(x) =
∫ x
0 du χ(u)∫ 1−z
0
du χ(u)
, (26)
where, with (24) and (25),
χ(u) = exp
(
−2N
∫ u
0
ds
{
T+(s)− T−(s)
T+(s) + T−(s)
})
= exp
(
2Nv
∫ u
0
ds
2bs+ 2− v
)
. (27)
Introducing (27) into (26) and performing the integrals,
one obtains
φC(x) =
(
1 + 2b2−v x
)1+Nv/b
− 1
(
1 + 2b2−v (1− z)
)1+Nv/b
− 1
. (28)
As shown in Fig. 4, this result is in excellent agreement
with numerical simulations and exhibits the same quali-
tative features obtained for the Fermi process (compare
with Fig. 1). The finding (28) implies that in the weak
selection limit where |v| ≪ 1 and N |v| ≫ 1, one has
φC(x) ≃


1− (1 + bx)−N(z−r) if z > r(
1+b(x− z−r
2
)
1+b(1− z+r
2
)
)N(r−z)
if r > z.
(29)
In particular, the probability that cooperation fixates
starting with a single cooperator, when z > r is given by
limNx→1 φ
C(x) = 1−e−|v| ≃ |v|. We therefore recover the
result derived from (16) for the Fermi process. Clearly,
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FIG. 4: (Color online). Probabilities φC(x) and φD(x) for
various z as functions of x/(1 − z), and the dynamics with
the Moran process (25). Results of stochastic simulations
(averaged over 2 × 105 samples) are compared with (28) for
z = 0 (×, dot-dashed), 0.08 (, solid), 0.12 (∇, dashed).
Similarly for φD(x) with z = 0 (⋄, thin dashed), 0.08 (◦, solid
gray), 0.12 (△, thin solid). The other parameters are N =
200, b = 1.0, c = 0.1 (|v| = 0.02).
this implies that under weak selection the fixation of a
single cooperator is favored by selection if the non-trivial
condition (17) is satisfied. Again, it is instructive to com-
pare (28), (29) with the result obtained in the absence of
facilitators, when φC(x)|z=0 ≃
(
1+b(x−r/2)
1+b(1−r/2)
)Nr
decays to
zero exponentially with N . The influence of the facilita-
tors on the fixation probabilities for the Moran process
is summarized in Fig. 4, where the same features as in
Fig. 1 are recognized and summarized as follows:
i. The fixation of cooperators is likely (but not cer-
tain) when the density of facilitators is higher than
the cost-to-benefit ratio (z > r).
ii. When |v| ≪ 1 and N |v| ≫ 1, selection favors coop-
eration invading and replacing defection if (17) is
satisfied. In particular, the fixation probability of
a single cooperator is limNx→1 φ
C(x) ≃ |v|.
iii. When z < r, selection opposes cooperation replac-
ing defection but the fixation probability of coop-
erators is exponentially enhanced by the presence
of facilitators.
B. Mean fixation times
In the realm of the diffusion approximation, the uncon-
ditional mean fixation time τ obeys the backward FPE
Gback(x)τ(x) = −1, with the absorbing boundary condi-
tions τ(0) = τ(1 − z) = 0. In the weak selection regime
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FIG. 5: (Color online). Rescaled mean fixation times as
function of x/(1 − z) for the evolution with the Moran pro-
cess (12). Results of stochastic simulations for τ are com-
pared with (30) for z = 0 (⋄, dashed), 0.16 (◦, solid black
curve), 0.24 (×, solid gray). Numerical results for the con-
ditional MFTs τC with z = 0 (∗), 0.16 (), 0.24 (+) and for
τD with z = 0 (∇), 0.16 (△), 0.24 (•). The parameters are
N = 200, b = 0.25, c = 0.05 (r = 0.2 and |v| = 0.04). Stochas-
tic simulations have been averaged over 2× 105 samples
c < b≪ 1 and continuum limit, with (25), one has
T+(x) − T−(x) ≃ −
v
1− z
x(1− z − x),
T+(x) + T−(x) ≃
2
1− z
x(1 − z − x).
With these expression, the backward FPE for the uncon-
ditional MFT reads
x(1 − z − x)
1− z
[
−v
d
dx
+
1
N
d2
dx2
]
τ(x) = −1, (30)
with τ(0) = τ(1 − z) = 0. When |v|, b ≪ 1, Eq. (30)
coincides with the FPE (19) for the Fermi process with
an effective population size N(1 − z)/2. The solution
to (30) can therefore readily be obtained from (19) and
(20). In particular, we infer from (20) that the MFT
scales linearly with N(1− z)/2 when |v| ∼ N−1, yielding
τ(x) =
N(1− z)
2
Fv(x), (31)
where Fv(x) is the scaling function (20) obtained for the
Fermi process. This function still satisfies the symme-
try Fv(x) = F−v(1 − z − x) yielding τ(x)|r = τ(1 − z −
x)|r→r′=2z−r, when z is kept fixed, as in the Fermi pro-
cess. In the same manner, from (31) and (23), we infer
τ(x) ≃
(
1− z
1 + z − 2r
)
τ(1 − z′ − x)|z→z′=2r−z (32)
when r = c/b is kept fixed and z is transformed into
z′ = 2r − z. The solution of (30), as well as the rela-
tionships (31) and (32), are in excellent agreement with
9the results of stochastic simulations reported in Fig. 5.
As for the FP, we can also consider the conditional mean
fixation times and it follows from (31) and (23) that for
the Moran process the conditional MFTs are related by(
1+z−2r
1−z
)
τC(1 + z − 2r − x)|z ≃ τ
D(x)|z→z′=2r−z where
r is kept fixed, in agreement with the results of Fig. 5.
The influence of facilitators on the MFTs with the
Moran process is summarized in Fig. 5, where the MFTs
rescaled by a factor (N(1 − z)/2)−1 reproduce the same
qualitative behavior obtained for the Fermi process (com-
pare with Fig. 3) and τ(x) is a humped function with a
pronounced maximum. Again, all MFTs scale linearly
with N (in the weak selection limit). Yet, the compar-
ison with the results for z = 0 reveals that, at a fixed
value of x/(1 − z), the presence of facilitators increases
the MFTs, see Fig. 5. Also, we notice that the monotonic
dependence of τC and τD on x is essentially independent
of the sign of v 6= 0 (in Fig. 5, v = ±0.04 and v = 0).
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed and investigated an al-
ternative scenario leading to the spread of cooperation
in social dilemmas. We have considered the evolution-
ary dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game in
the presence of a small number of cooperation facilita-
tors. These individuals participate in the dynamics only
by enhancing the fitness of cooperators. The influence of
facilitators on the evolutionary dynamics has been char-
acterized by computing the model’s fixation properties
in a finite population of size N . Here, fixation occurs
either in the state with only defectors (as in the classic
PD), or in the state where the entire population is com-
prised of cooperators and facilitators. The dynamics has
been implemented with the Fermi and Moran processes
and the same qualitative results have been found, which
demonstrates the robustness of our findings. Our ana-
lytical approach, corroborated by stochastic simulations,
is based on an exact treatment and on the diffusion ap-
proximation (Fokker-Planck equation) of the underlying
birth-death process.
Our main results concern the fixation probabilities,
whose properties crucially depend on whether the frac-
tion of facilitators z is more or less than the game’s cost-
to-benefit ratio r. When z > r, we have shown that
facilitators are very efficient in promoting the spread of
cooperators whose fixation is likely (but not certain, con-
trary to the mean field predictions) in a large population
with comparable initial densities of defectors and cooper-
ators. Furthermore, when the selection intensity is weak
and N ≫ 1, we have demonstrated that the invasion and
replacement of defectors by a single cooperator is favored
by facilitators and selection if b(z − r)(1 − z) > N−1
(where 0 < b ≤ 1 is the cooperation payoff benefit).
When z < r, defection is evolutionary stable and is the
dominating strategy. In this case, while cooperation is
unlikely to fixate, the fixation probability of cooperators
is still exponentially enhanced by the presence of facili-
tators. We have also studied the (unconditional and con-
ditional) mean fixation times in the weak selection limit
and found that these quantities grow linearly with the
population size. While a similar scaling is also obtained
in the absence of facilitators, their presence has the ef-
fect of significantly increasing all the mean fixation times
and hence to prolong the coexistence of cooperators and
defectors.
In conclusion, this work demonstrates that the pres-
ence of a small number of cooperation facilitators can
effectively enhance the spread of cooperation in a simple
model of social dilemmas and prolong the coexistence of
competing species. The influence of facilitators is partic-
ularly drastic when their abundance exceeds the game’s
cost-to-benefit ratio, in which case cooperation is gener-
ally the strategy favored by selection in large populations.
These findings pave the way to further investigations of
the influence of facilitators in other social dilemmas, e.g.
with mixed strategies and/or in spatial settings.
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